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I. INTRODUCTION
All civil rights1 are not created equal. A citizen's civil rights include
protections against actions by three different governments-federal,
state,2 and tribal. Although the substantive content of your rights
t Law clerk to the Honorable Sam A. Lindsay, United States District Judge for
the Northern District of Texas; associate-to-be in the Dallas office of Thompson &
Knight L.L.P.; J.D., University of Virginia, 2000; B.S., Iowa State University, 1974. I
am indebted to Professors Richard Merrill and Barbara Armacost for their insights
into Indian law and remedies for civil rights violations, respectively. Professor Merrill
also provided several helpful comments on an earlier version of this Article. For eve-
rything else, special thanks are due to Peggy Gitt. Any errors of fact or reasoning are,
of course, entirely my own.
1. Black's Law Dictionary defines "civil rights" as:
The individual rights of personal liberty guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and
by the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 19th Amendments, as well as by legislation such
as the Voting Rights Act. Civil rights include esp. the right to vote, the right
of due process, and the right of equal protection under the law.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 240 (7th ed. 1999). Functionally, these are restraints on
government, although the term is also often applied to similar restraints on the pri-
vate sector, whose origin is statutory rather than constitutional. See, e.g., Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994) (prohibiting discrim-
ination by employers based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin). For pur-
poses of this Article, I include within the definition individual rights guaranteed
against government intervention either by the Constitution or by equivalent mea-
sures-in this context, the Indian Civil Rights Act. See infra notes 52-58 and accom-
panying text. I exclude restraints against the private sector, such as Title VII.
2. Unless the context indicates otherwise, by "state" I refer to states, their politi-
cal subdivisions, and municipalities.
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against these different sovereigns is essentially identical,3 the forum in
which you can seek to vindicate your rights depends upon which sov-
ereign has violated them. If a federal or state government violates
your civil rights, you can seek a remedy in federal court, including
injunctive or declaratory relief and damages.4 In Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez,5 however, the Supreme Court ruled that you cannot chal-
lenge a civil rights violation by an Indian tribe in federal court, with
the limited exception of habeas corpus relief.6
The Martinez decision has garnered a significant amount of contro-
versy7 and has led to frequent proposals by academics and politicians
for Congress to explicitly establish jurisdiction in federal court for a
cause of action for civil rights violations by tribes.8 To date, no such
3. See infra text accompanying note 57 (regarding your rights against tribal gov-
ernments). The substantive protections against the federal government contained in
the Bill of Rights have mostly been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment's
prohibition against state action.
4. If your civil rights are violated by a federal official, an implied cause of action
in federal court will support both injunctive relief, see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 414-16 (1968), and damages, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-97 (1971). Comparable relief for viola-
tion of civil rights by a state official is statutory and is available under the terms of,
among other things, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
5. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
6. Id. at 72. One commentator referred to Martinez as "possibly ... the most
interesting decision ever written regarding civil rights." Christina D. Ferguson, Marti-
nez v. Santa Clara Pueblo: A Modern Day Lesson on Tribal Sovereignty, 46 ARK. L.
REV. 275, 276 (1993). Another commentator went further, calling Martinez, which
combines issues of civil rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction of the federal courts, "the
single most interesting case in all of Anglo-American jurisprudence." Robert Lau-
rence, A Quincentennial Essay on Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 28 IDAHO L. REV.
307, 307 (1991) [hereinafter Laurence, Quincentennial Essay]. Martinez has also been
called "the most interesting case ever litigated in English." Id. at 310.
7. See, e.g., Robert Berry, Civil Liberties Constraints on Tribal Sovereignty After
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 1 J.L. & POL'Y 1 (1993); Carla Christofferson,
Note, Tribal Courts' Failure to Protect Native American Women: A Reevaluation of the
Indian Civil Rights Act, 101 YALE L.J. 169, 170 (1991); Ferguson, supra note 6, at 276;
Robert C. Jeffrey, Jr., The Indian Civil Rights Act and the Martinez Decision: A Re-
consideration, 35 S.D. L. REV. 355, 355 (1990); Robert Laurence, Martinez, Oliphant
and Federal Court Review of Tribal Activity Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 10
CAMPBELL L. REV. 411 (1988) [hereinafter Laurence, Overruling Martinez]; Lau-
rence, Quincentennial Essay, supra note 6, at 307; Judith Resnik, Dependent Sover-
eigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 (1989);
Kevin J. Worthen, Shedding New Light on an Old Debate: A Federal Indian Law
Perspective on Congressional Authority to Limit Federal Question Jurisdiction, 75
MINN. L. REV. 65 (1990); Alvin J. Ziontz, After Martinez: Indian Civil Rights Under
Tribal Government, 12 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1 (1979).
8. See, e.g., Federal Court Review of Tribal Courts Rulings in Actions Arising
Under Indian Civil Rights Act: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs,
102d Cong. 2-4 (1991) [hereinafter ICRA Hearing] (statement of Sen. Gorton); Tribal
Courts Act of 1991 and Report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Entitled "In-
dian Civil Rights Act:" Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 102d
Cong. 49-51 (1991) [hereinafter Tribal Courts Hearing] (prepared statement of Sen.
Gorton); 144 CONG. REC. S1,155-56 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1998) (statement of Sen. Gor-
ton) (introducing the American Indian Equal Justice Act, S. 1691); 142 CONG. REC.
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action has been taken, and Congress adjourned without acting on the
most recent bill;9 but there is little likelihood that the issue will go
away. This Article reviews the Supreme Court's decision and propos-
als for congressional enactment of such federal jurisdiction.
In Part II, I provide a brief summary of the background against
which proposals for change must be considered. Sections A and B
provide an overview of the legal status of Indian tribes and Congress's
decision in 1968 to establish protections, similar to the Bill of Rights,
against tribal governments. Section C examines Martinez and its ef-
fect on these civil rights, enacted merely ten years earlier. Since Mar-
tinez, litigants have searched for ways to bypass that restriction and to
bring actions in federal court for civil rights violations by Indian
tribes. In Section D, I review these "avoidance" attempts and why
they have been unsuccessful.
Part II summarizes what is; Parts III and IV consider what should
be, that is, whether Congress should overturn the result of Martinez by
creating federal jurisdiction over lawsuits for violations of civil rights
by Indian tribes. Part III begins with general considerations concern-
ing whether access to federal court is desirable. These considerations
include questions about the relative capabilities of other courts, inva-
sion of the autonomy of subordinate sovereign governments, and the
deterrence effect of federal jurisdiction. As will be seen, these factors
illuminate the issue but do not clearly resolve it.
In Part IV, I turn to an examination of whether the problem of civil
rights violations by Indian tribes is serious. Fundamentally, this con-
cerns the ability and willingness of these subordinate governments to
comply with and enforce civil rights. How frequent and severe must
civil rights violations become before federal jurisdiction is warranted?
I suggest that a relevant comparison is to Congress's decision to grant
federal jurisdiction over civil rights violations by state governments.
The comparison between civil rights violations by state officials and
civil rights violations by tribal officials supports the conclusion that
E1704 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde, criticizing the lack of review
in federal courts of violations of the ICRA and proposing review by Congress); 138
CONG. REC. S11,804-05 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1992) (remarks by Sen. Simpson, introduc-
ing, on behalf of Sen. Gorton, a proposed amendment to another bill providing for a
study to "address the circumstances under which Federal court review of actions aris-
ing under the Indian Civil Rights Act may be appropriate or warranted"); 135 CONG.
REC. 3,527-32 (1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch, introducing the Indian Civil Rights
Act Amendments of 1989, S. 517); 134 CONG. REC. 21,932-36 (1988) (remarks by Sen.
Hatch, introducing the Indian Civil Rights Act Amendments of 1988, S. 2747); Chris-
tofferson, supra note 7, at 179-85 (proposing, for gender-based violations of civil
rights only, access to federal courts and waiver of sovereign immunity); Laurence,
Overruling Martinez, supra note 7, at 427-38 (proposing extension of federal court
review for violations of ICRA with important qualifications); Laurence, Quincenten-
nial Essay, supra note 6, at 339 (proposing overruling Martinez with important
qualifications).
9. American Indian Equal Justice Act, S. 1691, 105th Cong. (1998).
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the answer given by Martinez should not be overturned. Based on the
available evidence, violations by tribal officials are relatively infre-
quent. As discussed in Part II, there are serious potential concerns
associated with jurisdiction by federal courts over subordinate sover-
eigns. While the problem of civil rights violations by state govern-
ments is serious enough to outweigh these concerns, the problem of
civil rights violations by tribal governments is not.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Indian Tribes and Sovereignty'°
The sovereignty of Indian tribes is based on a unique relationship
with the United States and is limited by specialized doctrines of geo-
graphical, personal, and subject matter jurisdiction. In Cherokee Na-
tion v. Georgia," Chief Justice Marshall stated that "[t]he acts of our
government plainly recognize the Cherokee nation as a state,"' 2 but
characterized tribes as "domestic dependent nations" 13 whose "rela-
tion to the United States resembles that of a ward to a guardian." 4 A
year later, the Supreme Court held in Worcester v. Georgia15 that
states did not have jurisdiction over Indian tribes located within their
boundaries. 6 Although the tribes are sovereign governments, their
sovereignty is circumscribed.
Jurisdiction by Indian tribes is generally limited geographically to
"Indian country," as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151, for civil as well as
criminal cases. 7 "Indian country" is defined as "(a) all land within
the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government... (b) all dependent Indian communities
within the borders of the United States . . . and (c) all Indian allot-
ments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished .... ""
This generally recognizes the tribes' jurisdiction over their communal
land, whether federally-owned reservations or owned in fee simple. 9
There are two important qualifications to the geographic scope of
tribal jurisdiction. The first relates to the diminishment of reserva-
10. This section intentionally presents only an abbreviated overview of the issue of
tribal sovereignty as background for the discussion that follows. It vastly
oversimplifies a very complicated question, which is beyond the scope of this Article.
See Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority Over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1 (1999), for
an in-depth discussion on the issue of tribal sovereignty.
11. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
12. Id. at 16.
13. Id. at 17.
14. Id.
15. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
16. Id. at 561.
17. DeCoteau v. Dist. County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).
19. Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey
Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARMZ. L. REV. 503, 508-13 (1976).
[Vol. 7
2001] INDIAN TRIBES 123
tions through the process of "allotment." Under the terms of legisla-
tion such as the General Allotment Act of 1887,20 the executive
branch could divide up a reservation, allotting some to individual tri-
bal members, reserving a small amount for the tribe to be held com-
munally, and selling the remainder ("surplus") for the Indians'
benefit.2' Land allotted to individual Indians is still Indian country as
long as an Indian holds title to it22 while the "surplus" land may still
be part of Indian country, and therefore subject to tribal jurisdiction,
depending upon the circumstances surrounding the allotment.23 In-
dian tribes are thus unique in that their sovereignty may depend upon
who owns the land. State sovereignty, in contrast, does not depend
upon ownership of the land by citizens or residents of that state.
The second important geographical qualification is "Public Law
280,"24 which gave states the opportunity to exercise both civil and
criminal jurisdiction over most, if not all, reservations within their ter-
ritory.25 Reservations, therefore, may be subject to state jurisdiction
even though the land is owned by the tribe or its members. Six states
(the so-called "mandatory states") were specifically given such juris-
diction in Public Law 280,26 and other states were given the option of
exercising such jurisdiction. 27  Ten did, in whole or part 28 before
tribes were given the right to veto such an assumption of jurisdic-
tion.29 No states have assumed jurisdiction since then. °
20. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 331-358 (1994) (§§ 331-333 repealed 2000)).
21. See id. The right of Congress to alter reservation boundaries was upheld in
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-68 (1903).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c).
23. See Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994), for a general overview and an applica-
tion of the analytical framework.
24. Public Law 280, Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)).
25. Id.
26. Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994).
27. Public Law 280, § 7, 67 Stat. at 590.
28. Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, South Da-
kota, Utah, and Washington. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 362-63 n.125 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982 ed.).
29. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 401-403, 82 Stat. 73, 78-79 (codi-
fied as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1323 (1994)). Congress decided to give the
tribes veto power because of criticism by the tribes and concerns that tribal laws had
been unnecessarily preempted in some situations, resulting in a breakdown in law and
order. S. REP. No. 90-721 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1837, 1865-66 (Ad-
ditional Views of Mr. Ervin). Other than in these "additional views," this provision is
not mentioned in the legislative reports as it was not part of the bill reported out of
the committee. Donald L. Burnett, Jr., An Historical Analysis of the 1968 "Indian
Civil Rights" Act, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 557, 607-08 (1972). The proposed ICRA,
including this limitation of Public Law 280, was defeated in the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee but added as an amendment on the Senate floor. Id. at 608-11. The views of
Senator Ervin are particularly relevant as he was a prime mover behind this legisla-
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Restrictions on tribal sovereignty are not limited to geographical
considerations. Tribes are sovereign in the portions of reservations
that are "Indian country" and over which states have not assumed
jurisdiction pursuant to Public Law 280. That sovereignty is limited,
however, depending upon the subject matter and the person over
whom the tribe seeks jurisdiction. In this respect, tribal jurisdiction
differs dramatically from state jurisdiction, which is almost exclusively
defined in terms of territory.
Tribal jurisdiction is limited most severely with respect to criminal
jurisdiction. Tribes initially had exclusive jurisdiction over intra-tribal
crimes committed in Indian country.32 This jurisdiction is no longer
exclusive because the federal government has jurisdiction over certain
major crimes 33 as well as over crimes committed by Indians against
non-Indians in Indian country. 34 Tribal jurisdiction does not extend to
crimes committed by non-Indians 35 unless such authority has been
delegated by Congress.36 Generally, such crimes are the jurisdiction
tion and "the only member of the Senate who fully understood it." Id. at 574-76,
588-89, 602-03.
30. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 492 (4th ed., 1998).
31. Phillip Allen White, Comment, The Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine: "Just Stay on
the Good Roads, and You've Got Nothing to Worry About," 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
65, 65 (1998).
32. See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 570-72 (1883). Crow Dog mur-
dered Spotted Tail, according to prosecutors, because of a political dispute concerning
conciliation with whites, which Spotted Tail advocated and Crow Dog opposed (al-
though other explanations have been advanced). Sidney L. Harring, Crow Dog's
Case: A Chapter in the Legal History of Tribal Sovereignty, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
191, 198, 207 (1989). The Sioux tribal council negotiated a payment, to redress the
killing and restore tribal harmony, of $600, eight horses, and one blanket. Id. at 199.
The federal court sentenced him to death. Id. at 212; Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557. See
also infra text accompanying note 255.
33. The "major" crimes in question are
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A,
incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous
weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365
of this title), an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of
16 years, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this
title.
Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1994). This statute was originally
passed in 1885 in reaction to Crow Dog. See Harring, supra note 32, at 223.
34. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152. This statute provides for concurrent tribal jurisdiction; it
is not clear whether the Indian Major Crimes Act does so.
35. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978). Tribes did not
have criminal jurisdiction over Indians who were members of other tribes. Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990). Shortly after Duro, Congress "provided for tribal
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians." Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S.
438, 445 n.5 (1997) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1994)).
36. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1975).
[Vol. 7
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of either the federal government, if the victim is an Indian,37 or the
state government, if the victim is a non-Indian.38
Tribes have greater civil jurisdiction over non-Indians than their
corresponding criminal jurisdiction.39 Nevertheless, in Montana v.
United States,40 the Supreme Court concluded that because of the
tribes' dependent status, their sovereignty did not extend beyond the
control of internal relations and the protection of their self-govern-
ment unless authority was explicitly delegated by Congress.4' The
Court recognized two exceptions under which the tribe could exercise
regulatory/legislative authority over nonmembers: (1) consensual
(usually commercial) relationships between the nonmembers and the
tribe or its members; and (2) nonmember conduct on the reservation
that threatens or affects the tribe's political integrity, economic secur-
ity, or health and welfare.42 The Court subsequently confirmed that
decision and applied it to tribal judicial authority as well in Strate v. A-
1 Contractors.43 These limitations generally apply to land within the
reservation that is owned by non-Indians; the tribe has greater author-
ity over land that is owned by the tribe or individual members. 44 Be-
cause non-members may own much of a reservation's area, however,
these limitations can significantly reduce the tribe's sovereignty. 45
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
38. See County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 257-58 (1992) ("This Court's more recent cases have recognized
the rights of States, absent a congressional prohibition, to exercise criminal (and, im-
plicitly, civil) jurisdiction over non-Indians located on reservation lands.").
39. Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855-56
(1985). This case established a "tribal exhaustion" doctrine under which a party chal-
lenging the tribal court's jurisdiction must do so first in the tribal court system. Id. at
856-57. See White, supra note 31, for a critique of the tribal exhaustion doctrine.
40. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
41. Id. at 564 (holding that the Crow Tribe had no authority to regulate hunting
and fishing by non-Indians on lands within the Tribe's reservation owned in fee simple
by non-Indians).
42. Id. at 565-66.
43. 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997) ("[A] tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction [as to nonmem-
bers] does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.") (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 454 (stating that "tribes retain considerable control over nonmember
conduct on tribal land"); Montana, 450 U.S. at 557 (holding that "the Tribe may pro-
hibit nonmembers from hunting or fishing on land belonging to the Tribe or held by
the United States in trust for the Tribe" although the Tribe could not "regulate non-
Indian fishing and hunting on reservation land owned in fee by nonmembers of the
Tribe"). Strate involved an accident that took place on a right-of-way for a state high-
way, which the Court considered equivalent to land owned by nonmembers. Strate,
520 U.S. at 454. This is the background for the infamous comment by Justice Scalia
during oral argument concerning how to avoid tribal jurisdiction when crossing a res-
ervation: "Just stay on the good roads, and you've got nothing to worry about." Steve
Lash, Justices Map Alternate Route for Determining Tribal Court Jurisdiction in Non-
Indians' Personal Injury Suits, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 8, 1997, 1997 WL 4267.
45. See, e.g., Sam Howe Verhovek, Test of Indian Sovereignty and Government
Resolve, N.Y. TIMES, National Edition, Dec. 24, 2000, at 10. On the Yakama reserva-
tion, "nearly 80 percent of the 25,000 people are not Indians," and the conduct in
TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7
B. Civil Rights and Indians
The unique status of Indian tribes46 has profound implications for
civil rights. Most significantly, in Talton v. Mayes,47 the Supreme
Court held that because Indian tribes predated the Constitution and
did not derive their authority from it, they were not subject to consti-
tutional limitations on the federal government in the Fifth Amend-
ment.48 Subsequent cases held that Indian tribes were not constrained
by other provisions of the Bill of Rights. 49 Similarly, Indian tribes are
not states and therefore not subject to the restrictions on state action
encompassed in the Fourteenth Amendment.5" These distinctions, of
course, concern limits on tribal governments rather than on rights of
individual members of tribes; Indians have the same civil rights, and
the same recourse to federal courts, as do non-Indians.5"
In 1968, Congress addressed this anomaly by passing the Indian
Civil Rights Act52 ("ICRA") as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.11
Although congressional investigations found that civil rights of indi-
vidual Indians had been violated by "all three sovereigns in the fed-
eral system: state, national and tribal, ' '5 4 the solution was addressed
exclusively to violations by tribal governments. 5  With a few excep-
question (alcohol sales) is largely conducted "on privately owned land within the res-
ervation." Id.
46. "In contrast to many of the states, Indian tribes are arguably truly distinct
sovereigns." Resnik, supra note 7, at 679 (footnote omitted). "They have a status
higher than that of states." Native Am. Church of N. Am. v. Navajo Tribal Council,
272 F.2d 131, 134 (10th Cir. 1959). These observations, however, seem fundamentally
inconsistent with the deep encroachments into tribal sovereignty. See supra text ac-
companying notes 17-45.
47. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
48. Id. at 384.
49. See, e.g., Native Am. Church of N. Am., 272 F.2d at 134-35 (freedom of relig-
ion under the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
50. Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553, 556-57 (8th Cir. 1958).
51. "The line of authority growing out of Talton, while exempting Indian tribes
from constitutional provisions addressed specifically to State or Federal Govern-
ments, of course, does not relieve State and Federal Governments of their obligations
to individual Indians under these provisions." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49, 56 n.7 (1978). Indians in the United States were granted citizenship by means
of the Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(b) (1994)), and thus stand on the same footing as other citizens with regard to
protection by the Constitution against actions by federal or state governments.
52. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201-701, 82 Stat. 73, 77-81 (codi-
fied as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994)). This statute contains a number of
provisions in addition to those concerning civil rights protections against tribal gov-
ernments. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1.301-1303 (1.994) (concerning civil rights protections).
53. See Burnett, supra note 29, for a comprehensive review of the development
and enactment of the ICRA.
54. Berry, supra note 7, at 20.
55. Id. An early version of the ICRA apparently protected Indians only. Oli-
phant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 n.6 (1978).
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tions tailored to particular concerns of the tribes,56 the ICRA essen-
tially adopts most of the Bill of Rights:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of relig-
ion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of
grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and
seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or thing to be seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just
compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a
speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at
his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and
unusual punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any
one offense any penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment
for a term of one year and a fine of $5,000, or both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due
process of law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by im-
prisonment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than
six persons.
57
56. "[Tlhe ICRA resembles provisions in the United States Constitution's first,
fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments, and the equal protection and due process
provisions of the 14th amendment." U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE INDIAN
CIVIL RIGHTS AcT: A REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS 5 (1991) (hereinafter COMM'N REPORT]. One exception relates to the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment which was not considered appropriate for an
"Indian Bill of Rights" because of "the role of religion in the structuring of tribal life,
culture, and sometimes government." Id. Also, the right to "free counsel for crimi-
nally accused or a jury trial for civil cases" was not considered appropriate because
the cost could prove onerous for some of the poorer tribes. Id.
57. 25 U.S.C. § 1302. This section is incorrectly labeled "Constitutional rights,"
id., because the rights are statutory rather than derived from the Constitution.
2001]
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In addition, the ICRA explicitly provided for habeas corpus review in
federal courts.5"
At the time, at least some commentators assumed that remedies
other than habeas corpus would also be available in federal court for
violations of the ICRA.59 This was certainly a logical assumption be-
cause limiting the federal remedy to habeas creates some obvious
problems:
If no remedy other than habeas corpus were available, a large por-
tion of the rights guaranteed by the statute - all those which might
be infringed without "detention by order of an Indian tribe" -
would be unprotected and therefore ineffectual. For instance, ex-
clusion of members from the reservation or revocation of tribal
membership rights, discriminatory allocation of communal re-
sources, prevention of religious practices on the reservation and the
taking of private property for public use without just compensation
would be infringements of rights declared by the statute that would
receive little or no protection from the habeas corpus provision.
Lack of other remedies would clearly defeat congressional
purpose.6°
The federal courts asserted jurisdiction over such cases in a number of
instances. 6' However, in 1978, just ten years after the passage of the
ICRA, the Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of whether rem-
edies other than habeas corpus were available and concluded that
they were not.
C. Martinez
In Martinez, Julia Martinez challenged the membership ordinance
of the Santa Clara Pueblo,62 which provided patrilinear membership
rights under the equal protection clause of the ICRA.6 3 Because her
husband was Navajo, her children lost several rights associated with
membership. 64 After the tribe refused to change the membership or-
58. "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in
a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian
tribe." Id. § 1303.
59. E.g., Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal
Governments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1343, 1371-72 (1969).
60. Id. at 1371.
61. See generally Two Hawk v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 534 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1976);
Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 529 F.2d 233 passim
(9th Cir. 1976); Crowe v. E. Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231, 1233-34
(4th Cir. 1974).
62. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 52 n.2 (1978).
63. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8). See supra text accompanying note 57, for the text of the
ICRA provision.
64. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 52. As a result, the children "may not vote in tribal
elections or hold secular office in the tribe; moreover, they have no right to remain on
the reservation in the event of their mother's death, or to inherit their mother's home
or her possessory interests in the communal lands." Id. at 52-53. Failure to qualify
for membership could, and in this case apparently did, have serious consequences.
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dinance, she brought a class action suit in federal court.6" The district
court apparently concluded that the availability of declaratory and in-
junctive relief was implicitly authorized by the substantive provisions
of the ICRA and found for Ms. Martinez on the merits.66 The court of
appeals reversed on the merits but agreed that the federal courts had
jurisdiction, concluding that Congress must have intended to allow in-
dividuals to sue the tribe for violations of the ICRA, as otherwise, the
protections of the ICRA would constitute "a mere unenforceable dec-
laration of principles."67
The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed,68 concluding that it was
inappropriate to infer a cause of action69 other than that explicitly
provided by the ICRA. While this may have been the correct deci-
sion, Justice Marshall's reasoning is not completely convincing. The
starting point was the well-established principle that Indian tribes had
sovereign immunity from suit, absent consent or congressional abro-
gation and subject to Congress's plenary power.7" Tribal officials,
however, were not protected by sovereign immunity; it was therefore
necessary to determine whether the availability of declaratory and in-
junctive relief, although not mentioned in the ICRA, was nevertheless
implicit.7 The opinion cited previous cases that inferred a cause of
"Deprivation of material benefits, especially medical care, was a central hardship fac-
tor driving the Santa Clara case. Julia Martinez's daughter was denied medical treat-
ment because she had no tribal recognition and later died from strokes relating to her
terminal illness." Christofferson, supra note 7, at 174 n.42.
65. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 53.
66. Id.
67. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1042 (1976), rev'd, 436 U.S. 49
(1978).
68. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 55.
69. As pointed out by Professor Worthen, this case differed from the typical im-
plied cause of action ruling which addresses who can bring an action enforcing a fed-
eral statute-specifically, whether a private party can do so. See Worthen, supra note
7, at 88-89. In Martinez, the issue was not who can bring an action but where it can be
brought-specifically, whether it can be brought in federal court. Id.
70. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58. This was the "common-law immunity from suit tradi-
tionally enjoyed by sovereign powers." Id. Part III is the only section of the opinion
that Justice Rehnquist did not join, although he did not explain his decision. Id. at 51.
He did join Part IV, id., which held that tribal officials were also immune from suit in
federal court, id. at 69-70. In contrast, Justice White did not agree that tribal officials
were immune but did agree with Part III that the tribe itself retained sovereign immu-
nity. Id. at 73 & n.2 (White, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 59. Cf. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (allowing suits for
injunctive relief against state officials, although not directly against the state); Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890) (holding that states are immune from suit by citizens,
based on the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution). Suing the state official
under the Ex parte Young doctrine utilizes a legal fiction:
If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of
the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment
comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is
in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is sub-
jected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct.
Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60.
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action for violations of civil rights statutes, which did not specify rem-
edies, and then dismissed the previous cases as inapposite without
drawing clear distinctions.72
The basis for Justice Marshall's conclusion can be summarized as:
(1) the ICRA is intended not only to protect individuals against the
tribe but also to further Indian self-government; 73 (2) federal enforce-
ment of civil rights against the tribe conflicts with the goal of strength-
ening self-government;7 1 (3) Congress rejected proposals for other
methods of federal review of ICRA violations; 75 (4) the tribes who
testified at the House hearings apparently did not think that federal
jurisdiction for causes of action other than habeas corpus was author-
ized by the ICRA;76 (5) federal remedies other than habeas corpus are
not essential to the enforcement of these limitations on tribal power;77
and (6) the tribal courts would be more familiar than federal courts
with traditions and customs relevant to actions to enforce ICRA pro-
visions.78 While these arguments have a certain force, some also have
obvious flaws.
The fact that the ICRA had dual purposes is hardly surprising given
its nature as "omnibus legislation.1 79 Under such circumstances, one
would expect that not all portions of the legislation would be directed
at both goals. This is particularly the case when the two purposes are
essentially in conflict. Merely enacting these restraints on tribal gov-
ernments was inherently, and intentionally, a significant intrusion on
the right of self-government, regardless of the forum in which suits
could be heard.8" Another example is the requirement of tribal con-
sent before states assumed civil and criminal jurisdiction over areas
occupied by Indian tribes.8" This requirement presumably addressed
the furtherance of self-government by making it more difficult for the
states to take over vital functions of tribal governments. 82 It is equally
clear that the requirement is facially neutral with respect to the goal of
72. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 61. The cases in question were Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969), and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409 (1968).
73. See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 62-63.
74. Id. at 64-65.
75. Id. at 67-68.
76. Id. at 70 n.30.
77. Id. at 65. "Tribal forums are available to vindicate rights created by the ICRA,
and § 1302 has the substantial and intended effect of changing the law which these
forums are obliged to apply." Id.
78. Id. at 71.
79. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 30, at 505.
80. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 82-83 (White, J., dissenting).
81. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322 (1994).
82. Previously, Public Law 280 allowed states to assume such jurisdiction at any
time; several did so without tribal concurrence. This change eliminated the states'
ability to act unilaterally, and since then "[n]o tribe has consented to state jurisdiction
under Public Law 280." GETCHES ET AL., supra note 30, at 488-92.
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protecting the civil rights of individuals subject to tribal authority and
arguably undermines it. 3 That is not to say that the requirement is a
bad idea, only that it is not unreasonable, with two conflicting goals, to
find provisions that support one purpose and oppose another. This is
not evidence that Congress intended federal jurisdiction other than
habeas corpus, but neither is it as strong an indication as Justice Mar-
shall implied that Congress did not intend such a remedy. 4
The Court reached its conclusion that Congress decided against
remedies other than habeas corpus in part because Congress consid-
ered and rejected other proposals for federal review of alleged ICRA
violations arising in a civil context.85 That argument, however, loses
its power upon examination. The proposals in question were signifi-
cantly different from simply allowing lawsuits for injunctive or declar-
atory relief or for damages in federal courts. The first proposal
required the Attorney General to investigate complaints of ICRA vio-
lations and bring appropriate "criminal or other action[s]." 86 This
would screen out some civil cases, but it would also allow criminal
cases. Further, the plaintiff in suits against the tribe would be the fed-
eral government, a very formidable opponent, rather than the individ-
ual whose civil rights were allegedly violated. From the tribes'
perspective, fewer cases to defend, but against a more sophisticated
plaintiff with greater resources, could well be a bad bargain. The sec-
ond proposal involved adjudication of tribal actions by the Interior
Department, which could be initiated by the Department (even with-
out a request by the Indian whose rights were allegedly violated) with
available review in federal court of final decisions.87 Again, the dis-
similarity between this proposal and the relief sought by Ms. Martinez
is such that the conclusions drawn by Justice Marshall are
problematic. 8
83. The argument that the requirement undermines protection of civil rights
would be based on an assumption (not necessarily valid) that state courts are, because
more independent than tribal governments, more likely to protect individuals against
tribal authority than would be tribal courts. See infra notes 162, 259-60 and accompa-
nying text.
84. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 62-63.
85. Id. at 67. The Court found the rejection of these proposals regarding civil
actions more relevant to the decision in Martinez than Congress's rejection of the
provision in the original version of the ICRA, authorizing the federal courts to con-
duct an independent review of all criminal convictions obtained in tribal courts. Id.
The rejection of alternative remedies in criminal cases, where habeas corpus can pro-
vide a remedy, is arguably less significant than the rejection of alternative remedies in
civil cases, where habeas corpus is generally useless. See supra text accompanying
note 60, for examples of rights that would not be vindicated in a habeas corpus
proceeding.
86. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 67-68 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 68 & n.26.
88. See also id. at 75-79 (White, J., dissenting) (providing additional arguments
that the changes from the original proposals do not support Justice Marshall's
inferences).
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The argument that the tribes did not think the ICRA authorized
federal jurisdiction for the cause of action pursued by Ms. Martinez is
not very persuasive. As the Court noted, testimony at the hearings on
the ICRA was only given by a few tribes, which makes such a conten-
tion a bit of a stretch. 89 In any event, the relevance is indirect at best,
because surely it is Congress's understanding, rather than that of the
tribes, that controls.
Another issue inadequately addressed by the ruling in Martinez is
the general question of congressional power to limit federal jurisdic-
tion.90 This is a basic component of law school courses on Federal
Courts91 and also constitutes an area of the jurisprudence of federal-
state relations that is hotly debated by academics. 92 However, as Pro-
fessor Worthen points out, neither the majority nor the dissent even
discussed whether prohibiting jurisdiction by federal courts over
ICRA violations, if that was indeed what Congress intended, would
violate Article III of the Constitution.93 In any event, because the
Supreme Court did not object to the limits imposed by Congress, the
question has been answered implicitly in this context: Congress has
the power to limit federal court jurisdiction over claims arising under
this particular federal law.
The result in Martinez is probably correct, primarily because of the
argument that federal jurisdiction would constitute an assault on tribal
autonomy, but the Court did not develop its argument well. 94
Whether the decision in Martinez was "correct" or not, it is the law.
With no indication that it is likely to be overturned by the Court, al-
ternative strategies for gaining access to federal courts have been
suggested.
D. Getting Around Martinez
Martinez essentially foreclosed suits in federal court for violations
of the ICRA. The front door is firmly shut, but there are alternative
"back door" ways of getting to federal court that should be considered
89. Id. at 70 n.30.
90. "In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appel-
late Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Reg-
ulations as the Congress shall make." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
91. See, e.g., PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 213-39 (3d ed., 1994).
92. See Worthen, supra note 7, at 65 n.2, for a collection of law review articles on
the topic of "the constitutionality of legislative proposals limiting federal court juris-
diction over claims arising under federal law." Id. at 65.
93. Id. at 92.
94. The flaws, noted above, in some of the Court's arguments, combined with its
failure to present a stronger case for the tribal autonomy argument, see infra Part
III.B, made the opinion less persuasive than it might have been.
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before evaluating whether Congress should provide a remedy like 42
U.S.C. § 1983. 95
One possible way to get around Martinez would be to attack the
tribe's sovereignty. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,96 the
Court held that there were certain inherent restrictions on what pow-
ers can be exerted by the tribe over non-Indians on the reservation.97
The Court articulated a (somewhat unclear) test for determining
whether such a restriction applies: "Indian tribes are prohibited from
exercising both those powers of autonomous states that are expressly
terminated by Congress and those powers 'inconsistent with their [de-
pendent] status."' 98 Under this approach, an individual whose civil
rights have allegedly been violated can, instead of challenging that vi-
olation, challenge the very existence of tribal governmental power
with which the violation is associated.
Such a defense is apparently a legitimate way to prevent violations
of civil rights, although it also has limitations: it is only available to
non-Indians,99 the federal court may find that the tribe has not lost
sovereignty for the specific function challenged, 0 ° and it is not clear
whether damages (as opposed to injunctive or declaratory relief)
would be available. More important than whether such a defense will
work is whether it should work, and here, there is a very strong argu-
ment against it. A defense based on Oliphant is pernicious, a sledge-
hammer meant to destroy rather than the carefully calibrated
restraints on tribal sovereignty offered by the ICRA. 1' It should also
be noted that one of the reasons underlying the Oliphant decision ap-
pears to have been concerns that the tribes might violate individuals'
civil libertiesl 0-the very problem which Martinez provided could be
left up to the tribal courts. 10 3
95. The following is a brief overview of potential avenues that have been explored.
See Kevin Gover & Robert Laurence, Avoiding Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: The
Litigation in Federal Court of Civil Actions Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 8 HAM-
LINE L. REV. 497 (1985), for a full discussion of some of these alternatives.
96. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). Oliphant was decided only two months before Martinez.
97. See id. at 208.
98. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th
Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)). The specific holding was that the tribe lacked
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Id. at 195. The important issue for this Article
is the general test enunciated for determining whether a particular aspect of sover-
eignty has been lost. See id. at 208.
99. See Gover & Laurence, supra note 95, at 520.
100. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981) (collecting cases
holding that tribes could exercise jurisdiction over non-members as to specific
functions).
101. Id.
102. UNC Resources, Inc. v. Benally, 514 F. Supp. 358, 361 (D.N.M. 1981).
103. This appears to be a substantial and fundamental inconsistency between Oli-
phant (which tribes generally dislike) and Martinez (of which they generally approve).
Because of this tension, Professor Laurence has consistently linked his proposals for
overruling the latter with overruling the former. See Laurence, Overruling Martinez,
supra note 7, at 414-23; Laurence, Quincentennial Essay, supra note 6, at 339.
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Another obvious approach is to avoid the ICRA completely and
instead make a claim that constitutional rights have been violated.
Tribes are not ordinarily subject to the restrictions on governmental
power included in the Constitution," 4 but that simply puts them on an
equivalent basis to private individuals. Both tribes and private indi-
viduals can be made subject to the constraints of the Constitution by a
finding that their action constitutes "state action."' 5 However, the
degree of entanglement with the state or federal government neces-
sary to invoke the state action doctrine is such that the doctrine will
rarely apply. The Ninth Circuit did reach such a holding in Colliflower
v. Garland,°6 involving tribal courts which were, in effect, parts of the
federal government; 0 7 but that was a highly unusual situation. As the
court pointed out, these courts had been created by the federal, rather
than tribal, government and were still subject to partial federal con-
trol."0 8 Such holdings remain isolated exceptions, and the state action
doctrine is unlikely to apply in most circumstances.
Theoretically, the state action requirement could be bypassed by as-
serting a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), which refers to
acts by "persons."'0 9 Such an approach was tried before Martinez in
Means v. Wilson.'" Although the Eighth Circuit allowed a cause of
action against the tribe in that case,"' the court's analysis was incon-
sistent with the framework later enunciated in Martinez.' 12 In any
event, the Supreme Court has since held in United Brotherhood of
Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott" 13 that there must be some
involvement by or effect on a state or federal government to meet the
104. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
105. A discussion of the state action doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article.
See G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The
Search for Governmental Responsibility, pts. 1 & 2, 34 Hous. L. REv. 333 (1997), for a
thorough review of the doctrine.
106. 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965). A similar result was reached in Settler v. Yakima
Tribal Court, 419 F.2d 486, 488-89 (9th Cir. 1969).
107. Colliflower, 342 F.2d at 379.
108. Id.
109. The provision, in relevant part, is as follows:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire... for the purpose
of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under
the laws . . . the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the
recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any
one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994).
110. 522 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975).
111. Id. at 838-39.
112. Martinez applied the principles of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), in analyzing
at length whether the ICRA was intended to apply to tribal officials. Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59-70 (1978). Means never considered this funda-
mental question. Means, 522 F.2d at 838-39; Gover & Laurence, supra note 95, at
529-35.
113. 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
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requirements of § 1985(3).14 Thus, this approach is likely no more
viable than a cause of action under § 1983.
Finally, at least one specific exception to Martinez has been enunci-
ated. The Tenth Circuit allowed federal jurisdiction in Dry Creek
Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes'1 5 by distinguishing Marti-
nez.'1 6 The crucial distinction was that the case involved a non-Indian
plaintiff denied a tribal forum (because the tribes did not consent to
suit)., 17 However, as pointed out by Gover and Laurence, the deci-
sion in Dry Creek Lodge does not convincingly distinguish its facts
from Martinez, and it has rarely been followed." 8
Thus, most of the methods of bypassing the Martinez decision are
questionable, if not completely invalid. The "Oliphant spin-off" ap-
pears to be sound but limited in effectiveness and destructive in its
application. There is no good way to "avoid" the decision in Martinez.
The question therefore becomes whether Congress should effectively
overrule Martinez by enacting legislation explicitly providing federal
jurisdiction, as many have suggested. 19 For the answer to that ques-
tion, it is appropriate to first review basic principles underlying deci-
sions on the propriety of providing jurisdiction to federal courts.
II1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Federalists, Nationalists, and the Parity Principle
As described below, the question of granting jurisdiction to federal
courts, rather than state courts, has often divided judges and commen-
tators into two opposing camps. The respective positions seem to turn
on three underlying rationales: (1) the proper relationship between
the federal government and states, that is, federalism; (2) the compe-
tence and willingness of the state courts to enforce civil rights; and (3)
the relative independence of the state courts. Although the discussion
normally focuses on the relationship between federal and state courts,
similar arguments should be applicable to the relationship between
114. Id. at 833.
115. 623 F.2d 682, 685 (10th Cir. 1980).
116. Id. at 685.
117. Id. at 684.
118. The Tenth Circuit's concerns seem to have been that Dry Creek Lodge in-
volved a non-Indian plaintiff without a tribal forum. Gover & Laurence, supra note
95, at 501. The reason for denying federal court jurisdiction against the tribe in Marti-
nez, however, was the tribe's sovereign immunity against suit. Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978). The Martinez Court did not rest that conclusion
on the identity of the plaintiff or the availability of a tribal forum. Id. The Tenth
Circuit noted factual differences from Martinez, Dry Creek Lodge, 623 F.2d at 684-85,
but its conclusion that those facts were critical to the decision in Martinez seems un-
warranted as Martinez spoke directly and unequivocally to the issue of federal court
jurisdiction for a suit against a tribe for violations of the ICRA. Gover & Laurence,
supra note 95, at 499-515.
119. See supra note 8.
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federal and tribal courts. Nevertheless, many individuals have
switched camps when the focus shifts from states to Indian tribes.
Professor Fallon has described two opposing models of "judicial
federalism" as ways to think about, among other things, granting juris-
diction to the federal courts. 120 Professor Fallon uses this term to ad-
dress essentially all questions, in cases where both the state and
federal governments have interests, involving the proper forum for
adjudication. 2' The Nationalist model assumes that "state sover-
eignty interests must yield to the vindication of federal rights and that,
because state courts should not be presumed as competent as federal
courts to enforce constitutional liberties, rights to have federal issues
adjudicated in a federal forum should be construed broadly.' 122
Under the Federalist model, state courts, which are not presumed to
be inferior, are ultimately responsible for protecting constitutional
rights; federal courts have limited jurisdiction over the sovereign
state.123
Professor Fallon points out that many jurists and commentators
tend to consistently follow one or the other of these models.'24 Prom-
inent Nationalists include Justices William Brennan and Thurgood
Marshall and Professor Akhil Amar; consistent Federalists include
Chief Justices William Rehnquist and Warren Burger and Justices
John Marshall Harlan, Felix Frankfurter, and Lewis Powell. 125 Never-
theless, proponents of both positions, on occasion, take the other
side,126 undoubtedly in part because not all questions arising in this
area are close enough for one's theoretical preference to be
dispositive:
It is a feature of many federal courts debates-or so I have ar-
gued-that the relevant materials are sufficiently indeterminate to
support, or at least not to foreclose, alternative resolutions. But
when the evidence points with sufficient clarity to only one conclu-
sion, as it sometimes does, then the conscientious judge must reach
it, however badly it may accord either with previously held theories
of judicial federalism or with personal normative preferences.12 7
Others try to steer a middle course. 128
120. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV.
1141 (1988).
121. Id. at 1142 n.1.
122. Id. at 1145 (footnote omitted).
123. Id. at 1143-44.
124. Id. at 1146.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1225.
127. Id. at 1230-31.
128. For example, one prominent federal judge concluded that "if left alone, state
courts are fully capable of vindicating the rights of most citizens against governmental
oppression when the ultimate responsibility is theirs. But they tend to default when
their judgments are too often reviewed and revised by federal courts." J. Skelly
Wright, In Praise of State Courts: Confessions of a Federal Judge, 11 HASTINGS CONST.
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Nationalists often see the need for federal jurisdiction as strongest
in the area of civil rights. In fact, one of the most important cases in
the jurisprudence of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Monroe v. Pape,129 explicitly
discussed the fear that the states could not be trusted to safeguard
civil rights:
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was
to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of
prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws
might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of
rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment might be denied by the state agencies. 130
Inadequate protection by the state courts was of concern particularly
for civil rights because such rights are fundamentally different than
other types of injuries.3 Presumably, this concern was behind the
Court's decision to dramatically expand the scope of access to federal
courts for civil rights violations: "It is no answer that the State has a
law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supple-
mentary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought
and refused before the federal one is invoked." '132 One might expect
Nationalists to be particularly fervent in demanding, and Federalists
most likely to acquiesce in, federal jurisdiction over civil rights viola-
tions by state and tribal governments.
Although the Federalist and Nationalist models do not provide ab-
solute answers to issues of judicial federalism, they at least focus at-
tention on a relevant question in deciding policy: Are the state courts
equally competent at the vindication and enforcement of federal
rights?133 Many commentators, most notably Professor Neuborne,134
L.Q. 165, 181 (1984). Judge Wright advocated "greater self-restraint by the federal
courts and increased respect for the competence of the state judiciary," id. at 185,
which is not consistent with a pure Nationalist position. Neither does he fit into the
Federalist mold as he would not remove the power from federal courts to enforce
constitutional rights. Id. at 188.
129. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
130. Id. at 180.
131. See id. at 196 (Harlan, J., concurring) (endorsing the view that "a deprivation
of a constitutional right is significantly different from and more serious than a viola-
tion of a state right"). See also Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance
Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583, 672 (1998) ("In accord with the idea expressed in
Justice Harlan's concurrence that constitutional rights are especially important, the
Monroe Court took the view that adequate protection of constitutional rights requires
a federal remedy in federal court.").
132. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183. "[Monroe], coupled with the expansion of constitu-
tional rights which occurred during the 1960s, has led to what some commentators
have termed an 'explosion' of federal lawsuits to redress violations of constitutional
rights." Stephen J. Shapiro, Suits Against State Officials for Damages for Violations of
Constitutional Rights: Comparing Maryland and Federal Law, 23 U. BALT. L. REV.
423, 423-24 (1993) (footnote omitted).
133. Fallon, supra note 120, at 1153. "This issue has been labeled the question of
'parity' between federal and state courts." Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered:
Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 233 (1988).
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have contended that state courts are less competent than federal
courts, that is, that there is no parity between federal and state courts;
others have disagreed.' 35 Even Professor Neuborne admits today that
state courts rarely refuse to enforce clearly established federal
rights,'36 and his preference for the federal courts rests on a theoreti-
cal, rather than empirical, basis.
Professor Neuborne's conclusion that parity between federal and
state courts does not exist is based on historical patterns in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries 137 and on an analysis of institu-
tional factors ("technical competence," "psychological set," and
"insulation from majoritarian pressures")1 38 rather than empirical
studies of their rulings. 39 His preference for a federal forum is also
clearly driven by his desire, as a civil liberties lawyer, for decisions
favoring the individual over government. 40 Institutional factors, par-
ticularly technical competence, "may be troublesome to future civil
liberties lawyers," and a results-driven approach might therefore favor
jurisdiction in the state courts "if the Supreme Court retrenches from
[the Warren Court's] expansive decisions."' 14' Such a "preference for
a mistake-prone tribunal . . . of course, hardly constitutes a serious
forum allocation argument."' 4 2
Professor Chemerinsky concludes that "parity is an empirical ques-
tion for which there is no empirical answer."'' 43 Even if that conclu-
sion, based largely on the absence of a widely agreed definition of
quality and the difficulty of aggregating evaluations across courts and
issues, 44 is correct on an aggregate basis, there are undoubtedly many
situations where it is possible to reach an intuitive conclusion about
the relative competence of the court systems. All indications are that
policy-makers, who address issues of granting federal jurisdiction,
tend to discuss the competence of the lower courts. Federal question
jurisdiction was not granted until 1875, at least in part because Con-
gress trusted state courts to adjudicate such issues. 45 During the early
134. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
135. See Chemerinsky, supra note 133, at 234 & nn.4-5, for a review of the "propo-
nents of parity." See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976) (rejecting the
idea that state courts are less protective of federal constitutional norms).
136. Neuborne, supra note 134, at 1119. His concern lies more with situations that
do not involve clear law, where there are "strong legal and moral claims" on both
sides. Id.
137. Id. at 1106-15.
138. Id. at 1121-28.
139. Id. at 1116.
140. Id. at 1115-16.
141. Id. at 1124.
142. Id.
143. Chemerinsky, supra note 133, at 236.
144. See id. at 257-61.
145. Id. at 240. Federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994), was enacted
by the Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. Failure to enact such jurisdiction
earlier was hardly an oversight on Congress's part. The issue was specifically consid-
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twentieth century, Congress expanded federal court jurisdiction be-
cause of concerns that state courts did not support the Supreme
Court's decisions relating to economic substantive due process.146
Such explanations are not merely post hoc speculation by the com-
mentators; both Congress 147 and the Supreme Court 1 48 have used the
same paradigm to explain decisions about jurisdiction.
Similarly, recent congressional discussions have explicitly refer-
enced situations where ICRA rights have been violated to justify pro-
posals for federal court jurisdiction over ICRA claims. 149 Even the
decision in Martinez assumed that congressional authorization of such
jurisdiction would be based on inadequate performance by the tribal
courts, 150 rather than the institutional factors advanced by Professor
Neuborne 15 1 or general considerations of federal-state relations.
The controversy about federal jurisdiction over civil rights viola-
tions by Indian tribes, however, provides some interesting insights into
the general preference for federal courts. At least some individuals
from both sides of the Federalist-Nationalist debate seem to reach
conclusions opposite to their normal inclinations. For example, as
Professor Resnik points out, Senator Hatch has proposed federal ju-
risdiction for ICRA violations152 despite the fact that he often has
supported legislation to restrict federal jurisdiction in other areas.1 53
Similarly, the opinion in Martinez, which reaches an essentially Feder-
alist outcome, was authored by Justice Marshall and joined by Justice
Brennan, both of whom Professor Fallon identifies as most often tak-
ing Nationalist positions. 54
ered when the lower federal courts were established in 1789. See, e.g., Charles War-
ren, New Light on the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 65-68
(1923).
146. Chemerinsky, supra note 133, at 242.
147. "Likewise, congressional creation of habeas corpus relief for state prisoners
and the establishment of general federal question jurisdiction were accompanied by
statements of distrust in the state courts." Id. at 241.
148. "At a time of increasing litigation, the Supreme Court was called on to define
federal court jurisdiction and frequently did so with reference to conclusions about
the relative competence and trustworthiness of federal and state courts." Id. at 244.
See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976) (rejecting the idea that state
courts are less protective of federal constitutional norms).
149. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. 3528-31 (1989) (remarks by Sen. Hatch, introducing
the Indian Civil Rights Act Amendments of 1989, S. 517).
150. "Congress retains authority expressly to authorize civil actions for injunctive
or other relief to redress violations of § 1302, in the event that the tribes themselves
prove deficient in applying and enforcing its substantive provisions." Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978) (emphasis added).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 137-41.
152. See supra note 8.
153. Resnik, supra note 7, at 738. Legislative proposals from Senator Hatch to
eliminate federal jurisdiction include, for example, S. 37, 99th Cong., 131 CONG. REC.
101, 104 (1985) (enacted) (busing cases), and S. 583, 97th Cong., 127 CONG. REC.
3208-09 (1981) (enacted) (abortion cases).
154. Fallon, supra note 120, at 1146.
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Martinez was a lopsided 6-1-1 decision, with Justice Blackmun not
participating, Justice Rehnquist joining all but the section on tribal
sovereign immunity, and only Justice White dissenting (but concurring
that the tribe itself was immune from suit).'55 This could well mean
that Martinez is best understood as a case where the decision was so
clear that the Federalist and Nationalist models were irrelevant. 56
On the other hand, Martinez emphasized that "providing a federal fo-
rum... constitutes an interference with tribal autonomy and self-gov-
ernment beyond that created by" the Fourteenth Amendment.157 It is
difficult to visualize Justice Marshall, if there were no explicit congres-
sional authorization such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, being similarly con-
cerned about state autonomy in a case involving state officials and
minority appellants seeking federal jurisdiction. Perhaps the decision
is actually best understood as illustrative of Professor Fallon's obser-
vation that liberals most often fit within the Nationalist tradition, ex-
cept when a "liberal" result is better supported by Federalist
philosophy. 58
Federalism concerns probably constitute the strongest argument for
the decision in Martinez,'59 but these concerns would also argue
against federal jurisdiction over civil rights violations by states. As
such, federalism does not explain the changed positions in the Feder-
alist-Nationalist debate. Indian tribes may have a unique status 6 °
that implicates federalism concerns for tribes more than for states.
The reluctance to invade tribal judicial sovereignty by asserting fed-
eral jurisdiction in civil rights cases, however, seems inconsistent with
the overwhelming invasion of tribal sovereignty in general. 161 The in-
dependence of the courts from majoritarian pressure also fails to ex-
plain the flip-flop, because tribal courts seem, if anything, even less
independent than state courts.1 62 The relative positions of state and
tribal courts regarding competence and willingness to enforce civil
rights is less clear, but, if anything, this factor argues for empirical
comparison-as discussed in Part IV.
Martinez and subsequent efforts to extend federal jurisdiction over
civil rights violations by Indian tribes, in which prominent Nationalists
have "changed sides," suggest another underlying rationale for the
Nationalist position. The flip-flop could be explained by inferring
155. See supra note 70.
156. See supra text accompanying note 127.
157. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978).
158. Fallon, supra note 120, at 1146.
159. See infra Part TII.B.
160. See supra note 46.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 17-45.
162. "Real power in many tribal governments rests with the tribal council or legis-
lative branch .... Where courts do exist, they are often a creation of the tribal council
and therefore subject to and dependent on the council." 134 CONG. REc. 21,932-33
(daily ed. Aug. 11, 1988) (statement by Sen. Hatch). See also Ziontz, supra note 7, at
11. But see infra note 260 and accompanying text.
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that, in substantial part, the debate about federal jurisdiction is simply
an issue of political power. The relevant paradigms by which Nation-
alists are guided might be minority citizens oppressed by the white
governments (concerning federal jurisdiction over civil rights viola-
tions by state governments) as compared to the minority-controlled
governments trying to protect themselves from white neighbors (con-
cerning federal jurisdiction over civil rights violations by tribal govern-
ments). The flip-flop would be entirely consistent with an underlying
assumption by Nationalists that, regardless of who controls the gov-
ernment, whites control the power structure and are likely to exploit
minorities. Federal jurisdiction over civil rights violations by Indian
tribes would therefore be unnecessary because serious violations
would be improbable and plaintiffs would more likely use litigation as
a coercive tactic. If this Legal Realist perspective is really what under-
lies the Federalist-Nationalist debate, however, the general preference
for federal courts should not apply in a comparison with tribal courts.
B. Sovereigns in a Foreign Forum
The strongest argument for the result in Martinez is that federal
jurisdiction would constitute a double assault on tribal autonomy.
This is so, not only because lawsuits over which the tribal courts have
jurisdiction163 could be removed to a foreign forum, but also because
those lawsuits would be directed against official representatives of the
tribal government.'64 A federal forum thus constitutes an attack on
the judicial capacity of the tribe by allowing a foreign forum to take
jurisdiction; it also attacks the executive and legislative functions of
the tribe by subjecting action of tribal officials to review by another
government.
Such assaults on a sovereign's judicial capacity are perhaps best un-
derstood as resulting from a belief that the sovereign's courts cannot
be trusted. A familiar example is the provision for federal jurisdiction
over lawsuits arising under state law causes of action on grounds of
diversity of citizenship. 65 The Constitution permits such jurisdic-
tion, ' 66 and Congress decided to grant it.167 Many scholars think that
diversity jurisdiction was granted to the federal courts because Con-
gress feared prejudice by state courts against citizens of other
163. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
164. "[Sluits against the tribe under the ICRA are barred by its sovereign immunity
from suit." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978). Officials of the
tribe, however, are subject to suit. Id. Because the ICRA applies to actions of the
"Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government," 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994), ac-
tions by tribe members in their individual capacities are not subject to lawsuit under
the ICRA. Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 841 (8th Cir. 1975).
165. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994).
166. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
167. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 has its origins in the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11, 1
Stat. 73, 78-79.
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states.168 Such prejudice, however, is probably no longer a significant
factor in state courts.169
The attack on both judicial and executive/legislative capacity consti-
tutes an important distinction between Martinez and other cases that
found an implied federal cause of action for the enforcement of civil
rights, although Justice Marshall failed to present such an argument
clearly in Martinez. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 7' the Court con-
cluded that injunctive relief was available in federal court for a viola-
tion of 42 U.S.C. § 1982.' Although this statute establishes rights
without any mention of enforcement, the Court inferred enforcement
authority by federal courts. 72 In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
Inc., 73 the Court extended the holding in Jones to allow injunctive
relief for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 not only in federal court but
also in state court, so long as the state already had such equitable
power generally. 174  Similarly, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,'75 the Court concluded that
damages were available for a violation of constitutional rights.17 6
However, Bivens involved a suit in a federal forum for alleged viola-
tions committed by federal officials 77 and thus did not implicate the
same concerns about a foreign forum. In Jones, the alleged violations
of the federal civil rights statute were committed by private individu-
als' 78 and thus did not constitute an attack on executive or legislative
actions. Neither of these cases involved suing a government or its offi-
cials in a foreign forum. 179
It is also interesting to note that the pending decision in Jones was
discussed in hearings referred to in congressional debates of the 1968
Civil Rights Act. 8 ' Thus, while Congress was debating the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, which included the ICRA, they may well have
considered the possibility that the courts would imply a federal cause
of action and federal jurisdiction for a civil rights statute that was only
168. Abolition of Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction, H.R. REP. No. 95-893, at 2
(1978).
169. Id. at 5.
170. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
171. Id. at 414.
172. Id. at 414 n.13.
173. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
174. Id. at 238.
175. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
176. Id. at 392, 395-96. "And 'where federally protected rights have been invaded,
it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their reme-
dies so as to grant the necessary relief.'" Id. at 392 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678, 684 (1946)).
177. Id. at 389.
178. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 412 (1968).
179. Neither did the cases focus on the distinction between providing jurisdiction in
state courts and providing jurisdiction in federal courts. These cases are better exam-
ples of the typical implied cause of action ruling. See supra note 69.
180. Jones, 392 U.S. at 415 & nn.16-17, 416 & n.18.
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facially declaratory. This might support an inference that Congress
assumed federal jurisdiction would also be available for violations of
the ICRA. However, in 1968, the ICRA portion of the Civil Rights
Act may have received relatively little attention compared to the
other titles of the Act, so this argument is uncertain.
The assault on judicial and executive/legislative capacity is not a
trivial factor. For example, the federal courts generally have exclusive
jurisdiction over claims involving torts alleged to have been commit-
ted by "any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment,"'' although such cases presumably
involve state rather than federal law. Similarly, federal officials and
members of the armed forces can remove suits in which they are de-
fendants to federal court. 82 The Supreme Court has also held that
state courts cannot grant habeas corpus relief to federal prisoners.'
83
The most plausible explanation for all of these limitations on jurisdic-
tion by state courts is the reluctance of the United States to expose
itself or its employees to litigation in a "foreign forum." This reluc-
tance is hardly a unique concern of the federal government. States
often waive their sovereign immunity from suit, but only allow suit in
state court. 84
This combined assault on both judicial and executive/legislative ca-
pacity in Martinez is perhaps enough to distinguish the decisions in
Jones, Sullivan, and Bivens, which are indeed "simply not dispositive
here,' 85 even if Justice Marshall did a poor job of explaining why.
The proper analogy for Martinez, rather than to these cases, would be
to federal jurisdiction for violation of civil rights by state officials.
Such remedies exist-most notably, as explicitly provided by statute.
The most familiar example, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, establishes a cause of
action against anyone who deprives citizens of "any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."' 8 6
The fact that the cause of action in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was explicitly
enacted rather than implied from the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides a further argument in favor of the decision reached in Martinez.
A similar point was made in dissent in one of the cases implying a
federal cause of action:
A strong inference can be drawn from creation of such actions
against state officials that Congress does not desire to permit such
suits against federal officials. Should the time come when Congress
181. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
182. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1442a (1994).
183. Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 408-09 (1872).
184. Sovereign Immunity: Hearing on Oversight Hearing to Provide for Indian Le-
gal Reform Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 105th Cong., pt. 3, 5 (1998) [here-
inafter 1998 Hearing Part 3] (statement of Thomas LeClaire, Director, Office of Tribal
Justice, Department of Justice).
185. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 61 (1978).
186. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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desires such lawsuits, it has before it a model of valid legislation, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, to create a damage remedy against federal
officers.
187
The invasion of state sovereignty represented by 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
however, was not undertaken lightly. Neither should a comparable
invasion of tribal sovereignty be undertaken without strong justifica-
tion, at least part of which would depend on the extent of civil rights
violations by tribal officials that are not adequately addressed by tri-
bal courts.
C. How Much Deterrence Is Enough?
If state/tribal courts are already available to hear civil rights com-
plaints, why grant jurisdiction to the federal courts as well? The most
plausible justification from proponents of federal jurisdiction, it
seems, rests on their assumption that the federal courts will enforce
civil rights more effectively, in the process increasing deterrence and
therefore compliance."' Using this as a rationale for granting federal
jurisdiction, however, assumes that increased deterrence of civil rights
violations by state/tribal officials is always positive. This is not neces-
sarily the case. The optimal level of deterrence cannot be that which
completely prevents any civil rights violations. This would be
equivalent to saying that such civil rights are absolute and inviolable.
But even the most important civil rights can be curtailed without vio-
lating the Constitution under the appropriate circumstances. 189
Professor Schuck points out that monetary liability for their official
actions creates some undesirable incentives for "street-level offi-
cials."' 9 ° As a result, they may be over-deterred; that is, enforcement
187. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 429 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
188. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text. It is theoretically possible that
such proposed changes are motivated by a belief that it would allow defendants to
remove cases to federal court and win there when they could not in state/tribal
court-but that seems far-fetched, to say the least. The common perception is that
federal courts are more, not less, protective of civil rights than other courts. See, e.g.,
supra text accompanying note 140.
189. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("It should be
noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are
unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scru-
tiny."). Any given application of strict scrutiny analysis may, of course, be controver-
sial (as this one surely is), but generally the principle is not. See, e.g., Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 356-57 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, Black-
mun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (requiring that the
challenged action further a compelling government purpose and that no less restric-
tive alternative is available to overcome strict scrutiny analysis).
190. See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFI-
CIAL WRONGS 62-63 (1983).
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of legitimate government functions may be less than optimal.191 The
skewed incentives to which Professor Schuck refers are that: (1) if the
officials act, the general public receives associated benefits (e.g., re-
duced levels of crime) 192 while the officials bear associated costs (e.g.,
lawsuits for civil rights violations);' 93 and (2) if the officials do not act,
the general public bears resulting costs (e.g., increased crime levels) 194
while the officials generally do not incur any costs. 195 Several unique
aspects of the work of street-level officials (as compared to private
organizations) exacerbate these basic incentives by increasing the like-
lihood of lawsuits. For example, police interactions with individual
citizens are often non-consensual and coercive 196 and may risk serious
injury to citizens. 197 These officials' objectives are often subjective
and difficult to measure, 98 and are underfunded.1 99 The officials' ac-
tions are often discretionary rather than ministerial, but the circum-
stances in which they act often increase the risk of error.2 00 Finally,
the individual official is often the only potential defendant who the
injured party can sue.20'
Professor Schuck argues that officials, faced with these incentives,
are likely to engage in bureaucratic tactics designed to protect their
interests at the expense of the public's interests.202 These tactics in-
191. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259,
266 (2000).
192. See SCHUCK, supra note 190, at 64 ("nonmarketable collective goals").
"[O]fficials cannot retain any of the benefits that flow from their decisions." Id. at 68.
"This nonappropriability of benefits flowing from official choices is central to evaluat-
ing public tort remedies." Id.
193. See id. at 69-70.
194. See id. at 68.
195. Because their conduct is discretionary and difficult to monitor, "any official
duty to act affirmatively is as a practical matter unenforceable;" alternatively, "their
inaction may primarily harm people who are likely to remain passive or silent." Id.
196. Id. at 61.
197. Id. at 64.
198. Id. at 61.
199. See id. at 67.
200. Id. at 65-66.
201. Id. at 62-63 ("Because of governmental immunity rules, many victims of offi-
cial error can proceed only against individual employees .... ). The state is generally
immune from suit, absent consent or congressional abrogation. See supra note 71.
Although cities are not protected by the Eleventh Amendment, their liability for civil
rights violations is generally limited. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978).
We conclude, therefore, that a local government may not be sued under
§ 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is
when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsi-
ble under § 1983.
Id. If the violation does result from official policy, however, the city (unlike individ-
ual officials) has no immunity at all. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 658
& n.18 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
202. SCHUCK, supra note 190, at 71.
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clude inaction, delay, overly formalistic behavior, and modification of
their decisions, and the result of employing such means is overdeter-
rence and societal loss.20 3 Professor Schuck's analysis is not univer-
sally accepted in its entirety,20 4 but most observers believe it is
accurate at least in some circumstances:
Hard data are not available, nor are they likely to become so. The
best I can say is that the overdeterrence rationale for qualified im-
munity seems sometimes sound to me. More to the point, it seems
sound to the Supreme Court. Recent decisions support a robust
conception of qualified immunity, one that protects against damages
liability whenever a (barely) reasonable officer could have believed
his or her actions to be lawful. 2 5
This overdeterrence problem should be considered when discussing
the appropriate level of civil rights enforcement.
The primary response of the judicial system to these problems, in
the context of actions against state and local officials under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,206 has been the official immunity doctrines. Although officials
can be sued for injunctive or declaratory relief,20 7 actions seeking
compensatory damages are generally limited. The judiciary,20 8 the
legislature,20 9 and prosecutors 210 have absolute immunity for actions
taken in their official capacity. Other officials (or judges, legislators,
and prosecutors for actions taken other than in their official capacity)
generally have qualified immunity, under which "government officials
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liabil-
203. Id. at 71-77.
204. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. Ci. L. REv. 345, 345 (2000) (noting that
such analyses of incentives often rely on a market paradigm that does not accurately
reflect how governments operate).
But government does not internalize costs in the same way as a private firm.
Government actors respond to political incentives, not financial ones-to
votes, not dollars.... If the goal of making government pay compensation is
to achieve optimal deterrence with respect to constitutionally problematic
conduct, the results are likely to be disappointing and perhaps even
perverse.
Id. (emphasis omitted). See generally id. at 361-87 (utilizing models of government
behavior to analyze the deterrent effect of damages remedies).
205. Jeffries, supra note 191, at 269.
206. With some slight variation, the same immunity doctrines apply to suits against
federal officials under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389, 397-98 (1971). The primary differences are that: (1)
immunity for Congress is based on the Constitution rather than common law, U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 1, and is somewhat broader than that of state legislators; and (2)
the President has absolute immunity for official misconduct, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 731, 749 & n.27 (1982). The presidential absolute immunity, however, does not
extend to private conduct occurring before he takes office. See Clinton v. Jones, 520
U.S. 681, 694 (1997).
207. See supra note 71.
208. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967).
209. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1951).
210. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976).
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ity for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known. ' 211 The primary rationale for immunity
law is to prevent any distortion of the official's decision-making,212
although arguably, immunity defenses are also appropriate in some
circumstances to conserve the official's time and energy for his official
duties rather than responding to the lawsuit.2 1 3
Professor Schuck's analysis essentially concludes that neither the
immunity doctrines nor shifting the cost from officials to government,
through indemnification or insurance, adequately preserves the deci-
sion-making process of these officials.2t 4 Other suggested solutions to
the overdeterrence problem include expanding the liability of govern-
ment itself as an alternative to liability of officials 215 or replacing dam-
ages remedies with alternatives that create incentives based on politics
rather than on market forces. 216 It may be that the appropriate solu-
tion will vary based on the type of civil rights violation involved.21 7
But ultimately, some solution to the overdeterrence problem is essen-
tial-if the remedy is not limited, the right will be.218
The result in Martinez is essentially a middle point on the contin-
uum of solutions balancing deterrence and the effective functioning of
government. Tribal officials who allegedly violate the ICRA cannot
be sued in a federal forum, 19 thus theoretically providing them
slightly more protection against lawsuits, assuming that comparable
immunity doctrines develop, than street-level executive officials
(other than prosecutors) of state and local government. On the other
hand, tribal officials can still be sued in tribal court for violations of
211. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
212. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 692-93 (1997).
213. Id. at 720 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (justifying immunity by either
"official decision distortion" or "time and energy distraction"). This second justifica-
tion is particularly appropriate to presidential immunities and may be much less so for
other officials because of the President's status as the sole individual in whom the
federal executive authority is vested by the Constitution. Id. at 711-13.
214. See generally SCHUCK, supra note 190, ch. 4 (describing the factors that influ-
ence street-level officials).
215. See generally id. ch. 5 (title: "Toward Remedial Justice: Expanding the Dam-
age Remedy Against Government").
216. Levinson, supra note 204, at 417. See generally id. at 416-20 (illustrating situa-
tions where damages are not an effective deterrent to breaches of constitutional
rights).
217. See Jeffries, supra note 191, at 263. "[T]he law of qualified immunity should
be refined and rethought. It not only should differentiate damages from other reme-
dies, but also should differentiate damages among rights. Neither the rationales for,
nor the arguments against, qualified immunity apply equally to all constitutional vio-
lations." Id.
218. See id. at 273-79. "In these cases, the Court sometimes avoids unwanted civil
liability not by limiting the damages remedy, but by narrowing the underlying right.
Restriction of rights therefore functions as an alternative to qualified immunity. So
far as damages are concerned, the two strategies are equivalent." Id. at 275.
219. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59-70 (1978).
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the ICRA,22° thus providing them less protection than officials who
receive absolute immunity. Such absolute immunity for judges, prose-
cutors, and legislators is widely accepted, despite the fact that some
citizens will not be compensated for violations of their civil rights, be-
cause of the importance of protecting the decision-making of those
officials. Particularly given the interest in promoting tribal self-gov-
ernment, 221 a lesser degree of immunity for tribal officials seems rea-
sonable. Ultimately, it depends on a balancing of the societal goals
supported by immunity against the cost to uncompensated victims of
civil rights violations. Any such balancing, however, needs to include
an evaluation of the extent of such civil rights violations that are not
adequately addressed by tribal courts.
IV. EVIDENCE OF CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
None of the general considerations seem to provide sufficient sup-
port for a decision to provide federal jurisdiction over civil rights vio-
lations by Indian tribes. When the Federalist-Nationalist debate is
examined, one rationale (rarely acknowledged) for the Nationalist po-
sition actually argues against federal jurisdiction in these circum-
stances. The other two general considerations, the autonomy of
subordinate sovereigns and the appropriate level of deterrence, seem
to argue for a balancing test: How serious is the problem, and does it
justify the drawbacks associated with granting jurisdiction to the fed-
eral courts?
With that in mind, I turn now to an examination of the available
evidence. Proponents of federal jurisdiction often attempt to justifyjurisdiction with evidence concerning the existence of civil rights vio-
lations by Indian tribes. 222 What is missing in their arguments, and
what I try to add, is a measuring stick; that is, how serious should the
problem become before federal jurisdiction is made available? Luck-
ily, such a measuring stick exists. Congress has already faced the deci-
sion of whether to grant federal jurisdiction over civil rights violations
by a subordinate sovereign in 1871, when 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was en-
acted. A useful comparison, therefore, would be between the relative
ability and willingness to enforce civil rights of state governments in
1871 and that of tribal governments today. There are important dis-
tinctions between the states and the tribes that may limit the utility of
the comparison, 223 but it still has value.
220. Id. at 65.
221. See supra text accompanying note 73.
222. See supra note 8.
223. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 7, at 680, 744-45.
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A. State Governments,
The federal cause of action for state violations of constitutional
rights, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, came from the Ku Klux Klan Act
of 1871.24 The Act was passed in response to a "rising tide of vio-
lence, 2 2 5 that involved "a wave of murders and assaults ... against
both blacks and Union sympathizers. '2 2 6 State governments were evi-
dently unwilling or unable to enforce civil rights, creating the need for
federal enforcement.227 This was evidently not "inability" in the same
sense as for Indian tribes, which has to do with inadequacy of re-
sources. Here, the resources were clearly sufficient in Congress's
opinion; federal laws were vigorously enforced by the states against,
but not on behalf of, Union sympathizers.2 2 8 At that time, the federal
government relied on state courts to enforce the Constitution and fed-
eral laws protecting all citizens,2 29 but such reliance was misplaced.
The debate over the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (and other enforce-
ment acts related to the Reconstruction Amendments) was acrimoni-
ous, as might be expected, with Democrats downplaying the violence
and Republicans emphasizing it.2 30
Dixie was not the utopia which the Democrats pictured, nor, in all
probability, was life, liberty, and property so insecure as the Repub-
licans claimed. Admitting this, however, one is still left with the fact
that Negroes were discriminated against at the polls and that several
states were either unable or unwilling to provide protection. There
was need.231
There was substantial evidence of widespread violence and lynching,
directed at both blacks and whites, throughout the South, 32 and
Klansmen could not be convicted, regardless of the sufficiency of evi-
dence.233 One state reported over 150 cases of murder, vicious beat-
ings, and people forced to flee for their lives; similar events were
taking place in most other Southern states.2 34 Both before and after
the Act was passed, federal action, including the use of military force,
was necessary to safeguard citizens and suppress the Klan. 35 A Texas
224. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 419 n.1 (1973).
225. Id. at 426.
226. Id. at 425.
227. Id. at 426.
228. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 505 (1871) (statement by Sen. Pratt).
229. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 245 (1967).
230. See generally EVERETTE SWINNEY, SUPPRESSING THE Ku KLUX KLAN: THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 1870-74 (1987) (discussing
the background, debates, and implementation of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth Amendments and related acts).
231. Id. at 86 (discussing the Fifteenth Amendment).
232. E.g., id. at 94-96, 131-33, 144-46.
233. Id. at 134. "[N]o Klan member had ever been convicted [in North Carolina],
despite the fact that thousands of crimes had been committed." Id. at 136.
234. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 321 (1871) (statement by Rep. Stoughton).
235. See SWINNEY, supra note 230, at 189-94.
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Senator argued that only the military could be trusted to enforce the
Act because in some areas, law enforcement officers were participat-
ing in violations of the Act.2 36
Establishing federal jurisdiction for violations of constitutional
rights by state officials was clearly not a casual decision but an emer-
gency measure. Similarly, increased use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 during
the 1960s was based on widespread failure of Southern courts to pro-
tect civil rights.237
In contrast, when Congress extended the provisions of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 to actions by officials of the District of Columbia in 1979,238 the
discussion focused on the theoretical inability of a District citizen to
sue in federal court under § 1983.239 There was no discussion about
the frequency or severity of violations of constitutional rights nor of
the failure of the District government to enforce those rights. 240 In-
stead, the District of Columbia supported this expansion of its liability
specifically to give its citizens the same rights as citizens of other states
and territories. 24 1 Indeed, the legislation was unopposed at the hear-
ing by the Subcommittee on Judiciary.242 In that respect, it provides a
poor model for the appropriate congressional response when a
subordinate government does not want federal enforcement against it.
B. Tribal Governments
The record is much less clear in the case of alleged violations of civil
rights by tribal governments. Even before passage of the ICRA, such
violations were not considered deliberate. The Senate Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights concluded that although actions by tribal
governments seriously jeopardized their members' rights, violations
were generally due to the tribal judiciary's inexperience and inade-
quate training with respect to American legal traditions and forms
rather than malice on the part of tribal officials.2 43 The problems
identified by the Subcommittee included: (1) over half of the tribal
constitutions of organized tribes did not protect individual civil rights;
236. Id. at 77.
237. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guar-
anteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State
Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 794-99 (1965).
238. Act of Dec. 29,1979, Pub. L. No. 96-170, 93 Stat. 1284 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)).
239. See H.R. REP. No. 96-548, reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2609.
240. Id. In fact, the District of Columbia had been granted home rule authority
only six years earlier in 1973, see id., not very much time in which to have developed a
history of failing to redress frequent and severe civil rights violations by the District's
court system.
241. Id. at 3. This sounds very much like the District of Columbia's well-known
concern about second-class status compared to the states rather than concern about
adequate enforcement of rights.
242. Id.
243. 113 CONG. REC. 13,473 (1967) (statement of Sen. Ervin).
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(2) tribal courts did not always provide adequate due process (prima-
rily jury trials, appellate review, freedom from self-incrimination, and
right to counsel); and (3) there were instances of abuse of council
power (e.g., prohibiting the use of peyote in violation of freedom of
religion and ordinances prohibiting private drunkenness).244
While these problems were serious, they did not necessarily require
federal review of alleged violations. Of the three categories of
problems, the first would be rendered moot by enactment of the
ICRA, and the second could often be remedied by the habeas corpus
review provided by the ICRA. The third, to the extent federal habeas
corpus review was not available, would be subject to protection only
by the tribal courts after Martinez, but other than inadequate funding
and the separation of powers issue,245 no reasons were advanced why
such protection would be inadequate. It was also true that lack of
resources for law enforcement was the principal cause behind viola-
tions of civil rights.246 This lack of resources also influenced tribal
resistance to any review of their courts' decisions by federal courts
which would likely have required the tribes to expend scarce re-
sources for more prosecutors, maintenance of detailed court records,
and the implementation of formal procedures. 47 More importantly,
the violations by tribal governments were relatively minor compared
to those by other governments. 48
The tribes that testified before the Subcommittee appeared cau-
tiously open to the proposals, with concerns primarily related to inad-
equate funding and submission to a foreign legal tradition. 249 The
Pueblos appear to have been the main opponent of the proposals.2
Some non-Indians shared these concerns. For example, during debate
on the bill, Representative Aspinall expressed concerns that the Civil
Rights Act was benefiting one minority (blacks) at the expense of an-
other (Indians) and that tribal courts might be destroyed as a result of
the requirements of the ICRA.25'
Indications since enactment of the ICRA have been mixed. There
has been testimony of uncorrected violations of the ICRA 52 as well
as testimony that the tribal courts have been adequately protecting
244. See Burnett, supra note 29, at 579-82.
245. See supra note 162.
246. Burnett, supra note 29, at 581.
247. Id. at 593.
248. "[I]f the volume of complaints is any guide to the seriousness of a problem, the
greatest threat to the civil liberties of Indians was presented by the enforcement of
state criminal laws by local authorities in communities relatively near Indian reserva-
tions." Id. at 584. See id. at 584-87, for an extended discussion of violations by state
and local authorities.
249. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 56, at 7-10.
250. Id. See also Burnett, supra note 29, at 601.
251. Burnett, supra note 29, at 613.
252. See, e.g., ICRA Hearing, supra note 8, at 36-44 (statements of J. Tonny Bow-
man, James A. Manley).
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civil rights under the ICRA" 3 It is clear that the Indians themselves
feel that their system does an acceptable job of administering jus-
tice,254 if not better than that of the United States. A tribal represen-
tative claimed superiority for tribal justice by referring to one of the
most famous cases in Indian law:
Before all this came about we had our own method of dealing with
law-breakers and in settling disputes between members. That all
changed when Crow Dog killed Spotted Tail. Of course, our
method of dealing with that was Crow Dog should go take care of
Spotted Tail's family, and if he didn't do that we'd banish him from
the tribe. But that was considered too barbaric, and thought per-
haps we should hang him like civilized people do, so they passed the
Major Crimes Act that said we don't know how to handle murder-
ers and they were going to show us. 255
Structured studies, as opposed to anecdotal evidence, have shown
that violations of civil rights by tribal governments are less serious
than might be anticipated. One review of published tribal court opin-
ions during the twenty years after Martinez concluded that tribal
courts were as protective of civil rights as were federal courts despite
the tribes' serious financial constraints. 256 Only thirty-two tribal court
cases involving the ICRA were reported from 1983 through 1996, and
approximately ten federal district court ICRA cases per year nation-
wide have been reported in the ten years between passage of the
ICRA and Martinez.257 A review of those cases shows that the tribal
courts have generally done a good job. Although not all ICRA claims
have won, when the conditions warranted overturning action by the
tribal government, the tribal courts have not been reluctant to do
so.
25 8 One of the greatest fears of Martinez opponents, that tribal
courts were not sufficiently independent of the executive and legisla-
tive functions, 9 was contradicted by the review's finding that when
tribal courts and tribal councils disagreed in interpreting and enforc-
253. See, e.g., id. at 24-27 (statement of Robert Laurence, Professor, School of
Law, University of Arkansas); Tribal Courts Hearing, supra note 8, at 7-10 (statement
of Monroe G. McKay, Judge, U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals).
254. See, e.g., ICRA Hearing, supra note 8, at 6-23 (statements of Alex Lunderman,
Tribal President, Rosebud Sioux Tribe; Nelson Gorman, Speaker, Navajo Nation Tri-
bal Council; Patrick Lee, Chief Tribal Judge, Oglala Sioux Tribe; Mark Van Norman,
Tribal Attorney, Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe).
255. Tribal Courts Hearing, supra note 8, at 42 (statement of Wayne Ducheneaux,
President, National Congress of American Indians). See supra note 32, for a descrip-
tion of the case to which the speaker referred.
256. Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill of Rights at
Thirty Years, 34 IDAHo L. REV. 465, 489 (1998).
257. See id. at 491.
258. See generally id. at 492-513 (demonstrating tribal courts overturning tribal
government actions when appropriate).
259. See supra note 162.
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ing the ICRA and tribal law, the courts' position generally won.260
Although "tribal courts are desperately underfunded, ' 26 1 civil rights
violations by tribal governments are not a serious problem:
Persistent critics of tribal governments seem to presuppose that tri-
bal courts are incapable or unwilling to enforce the Indian Bill of
Rights without close federal supervision. The evidence suggests
that efforts to strip tribes of sovereign immunity or to greatly ex-
pand federal review of tribal courts are overbroad remedies for an
exaggerated problem, unfairly based on anecdote and cultural
prejudice. 26 2
Similar results are shown in data outside the tribal court system.
For example, during the seven years before Martinez, just over eigh-
teen percent of civil rights complaints involving Indians that were re-
ceived by the Justice Department were ICRA complaints.263
Apparently, most tribal governments committed few, if any, civil
rights violations.264 Of seventy-one complaints concerning the ICRA
from 1978 through 1988, only four tribes had more than two com-
plaints lodged against them.265
In recent years, congressional concerns about tribal governments
and their exercise of power have focused more on the overall question
of sovereign immunity rather than on whether a federal forum is avail-
able for challenging violations of the ICRA.266 This is, of course, an
analytically distinct issue-whether the tribe can be sued as opposed
to where it can be sued-and it encompasses a much broader range of
causes of action.267 In Martinez, the Court analyzed the question of
sovereign immunity first, answering it in the affirmative for the tribe
260. McCarthy, supra note 256, at 493. Of course, this observation does not com-
pletely address the question of whether tribal courts might be avoiding clashes with
tribal councils by reaching decisions that might differ if the courts were truly indepen-
dent. At most, their success in those clashes which do occur implies that they are less
concerned about, and less likely to avoid, such clashes than might otherwise be
assumed.
261. Id. at 513.
262. Id.
263. 135 CONG. REC. 3529 (1989) (remarks by Sen. Hatch).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 3531.
266. See, e.g., Sovereign Immunity: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs,
105th Cong., pt. 1 (1998); Sovereign Immunity: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on In-
dian Affairs, 105th Cong., pt. 2 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 Hearing Part 2]; 1998 Hearing
Part 3, supra note 184; Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Hearing on Tribal Sovereign Immu-
nity Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 104th Cong. (1996) [hereinafter 1996
Hearing].
267. It is also sometimes a misleading issue. The 1996 proposal was a "blanket
waiver of tribal sovereign immunity and authoriz[ation of] actions for injunctive relief
and damages, in Federal and State courts." 1996 Hearing, supra note 266, at 8 (state-
ment of Robert T. Anderson, Associate Solicitor, Division of Indian Affairs, Depart-
ment of the Interior). In comparison, the federal and state governments have waived
part, but not all, of their sovereign immunity. 1998 Hearing Part 2, supra note 266, at
38 (statement of Susan Williams); 1998 Hearing Part 3, supra note 184, at 5, 18-20
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itself and in the negative for an individual officer of the tribe, before
proceeding to the question of the availability of a federal forum. 6 s
Because recent congressional hearings have focused on the broader
issue, many of the complaints and anecdotal evidence presented have
related to problems other than violations of the ICRA: commercial
disputes, tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian lands within the reserva-
tion, taxation, Indian gaming, speeding tickets issued by state authori-
ties on the basis of reports by tribal law enforcement officers, land
ownership, rent increases, etc. 269 A review of reported cases (in fed-
eral, state, and tribal courts) involving a claim of sovereign immunity
showed that only 22 out of 214 cases involved alleged civil rights viola-
tions. 270 The number involving alleged ICRA violations was even
less, as the twenty-two cases identified involved not only the ICRA
but also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and similar causes of action.2 7'
While some anecdotal evidence points to inadequate protection of
ICRA rights, the balance of evidence from more thorough reviews 2 72
supports a conclusion that violations of the ICRA by tribal officials
are not a serious problem today. While additional funding and train-
ing may be appropriate, the problems that do exist today are several
orders of magnitude less than those which justified establishing fed-
eral jurisdiction for violation of constitutional rights by state officials.
V. CONCLUSION
In determining whether to provide federal jurisdiction for violations
of civil rights by a state or tribal government, there are two potential
perspectives. Such a remedy can be considered either a normal state
of affairs in today's world of a dominant federal government or an
extreme remedy justified only by extreme need. If the first paradigm
is the appropriate way to think about inter-government relations, it
would clearly be appropriate to provide federal jurisdiction, not lim-
ited to habeas corpus, for ICRA violations. If the second paradigm is
more appropriate, providing federal jurisdiction should depend on ev-
idence of widespread and frequent violations of ICRA rights for
which tribal courts do not provide adequate relief. Although any vio-
lation of civil rights is serious, under this paradigm the evidence to
date seems insufficient to support federal jurisdiction.
(statements of Thomas LeClaire, Director, Office of Tribal Justice, Department of
Justice; Eric Eberhard).
268. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978).
269. See, e.g., 1996 Hearing, supra note 266, at 749-868 (letters to Sen. Gorton).
Actual violations of civil rights under ICRA seem few and far between.
270. Id. at 93-96 (testimony of Lawrence Long, Chief Deputy Attorney General,
State of South Dakota).
27 1. Id.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 256-60, 263-65, 270.
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The enactment of what came to be 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was an instance
of the second paradigm, and it was clearly justified. Without such jus-
tification, it would likely not have been enacted. It is not entirely
clear whether, with a tabula rasa and based on evidence of minimal
violations of civil rights comparable to that for tribal governments,
such a statute making state officials subject to suit in a foreign forum
could be passed today. 273 Although the experience of the District of
Columbia 274 suggests it might, that situation is atypical. The decisions
by the federal and state governments to limit when and where they
can be sued,275 which may be a better indication of how states would
react to such a proposal, point instead toward the second paradigm.
Based on this analysis, the most appropriate response seems to be to
leave federal jurisdiction for ICRA violations where Martinez placed
it-limited to habeas corpus. Any proposal to extend federal jurisdic-
tion should take into account how the states would react in a compa-
rable position and afford the tribes equal dignity.
273. This is, of course, distinct from the question whether existing remedies against
state governments should be eliminated.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 238-42.
275. See supra note 267.
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